Hungary’s Return to the EU: Already Underway, But Far from Complete

Based on the developments in Hungary over the past few days, it would be difficult to argue that relations between Hungary and the European Union are simply returning to where they were before Viktor Orbán came to power.

Manfred Weber, President of the European People’s Party, visited Budapest, and Péter Magyar indicated that Tisza would be ready to join the European People’s Party itself once the so-called Article 7 procedure launched against Hungary in 2018 is closed. Tisza’s MEPs have already been members of the EPP parliamentary group since 2024, but the latest move would signal the Hungarian governing party’s full political reintegration into the European centre-right.

The Weber–Magyar meeting is significant because this is not simply a matter of a new Hungarian government establishing relations with a European political family. After years of political conflict between the EPP and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, the same European political family that was itself an important actor in Hungary’s growing isolation under Orbán is now talking about Hungary’s return. Weber had already indicated in the spring that the new Hungarian government’s pro-European orientation could justify bringing the Article 7 procedure to an end.

The financial relationship has seen an even more striking shift. At the end of May, the European Commission agreed to unlock a total of around €16.4 billion in previously frozen EU funds for Hungary. According to Reuters, the package consists of €10 billion from the EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund, €4.2 billion in cohesion funds and a further €2.2 billion linked to reforms concerning academic freedom. The decision represented a major change from the situation under the previous government, when EU funds had been frozen over rule-of-law and corruption concerns.

The most important part of the package is the roughly €10 billion available through the Recovery and Resilience Facility. On 10 July, EU member states approved Hungary’s revised recovery plan, which is expected to make around €10 billion available to the country: approximately €6.5 billion in grants and €3.5 billion in loans. The significance of the decision is increased by the fact that the Recovery and Resilience Facility is a temporary instrument, with the final phase of its implementation taking place in 2026. Hungary therefore has only a very narrow window in which to secure the funds.

31 August was therefore a key date. The Hungarian government said that it had completed all the necessary milestones, meaning that Hungary had, in principle, fulfilled the conditions required to access the full €10 billion recovery package. This point needs to be stated precisely, however: meeting the deadline did not mean that €10 billion was automatically transferred to Hungary’s account on 31 August. The European Commission still has to assess the fulfilment of the conditions, after which the formal payment process can proceed.

The stakes are nevertheless enormous. As Reuters noted in May, the scale of the previously frozen funds now being made available is highly significant for the Hungarian economy. The financing is therefore not merely a political symbol: it provides the new government with economic room for manoeuvre, investment opportunities and a tangible result of the normalisation of relations with the EU.

The political return, however, does not mean that Hungary is abandoning its own position on every European issue. The renewed migration dispute, coinciding with Weber’s visit, illustrates this particularly clearly. Péter Magyar has made it clear that the Tisza government intends to maintain Hungary’s strict border controls and does not simply intend to adopt the EU solutions that the previous Hungarian government rejected.

One of the most sensitive points is the €1 million-a-day fine imposed by the European Court of Justice. Hungary is paying the penalty because the EU court found that it had failed to comply with its obligations under EU asylum and return rules. Péter Magyar asked Weber for help in resolving the fine, while making it equally clear that Hungary would continue to protect its external borders.

Migration is therefore a particularly interesting test of what Hungary’s “return” to Europe will actually mean. Tisza does not intend to dismantle every element of Orbán’s migration policy. Rather, it appears to be changing the political method through which Hungary seeks to defend its interests within the EU. The emphasis is shifting from permanent confrontation towards negotiation.

This could become one of the defining differences in Hungary’s new EU policy. Under Viktor Orbán, conflict with Brussels was itself part of Hungary’s political strategy: EU institutions were often presented not as partners but as political adversaries. Péter Magyar, by contrast, appears to want not less Hungarian interest representation, but a different kind of interest representation. The objective is not for Budapest to agree with Brussels on every issue, but for the Hungarian government to pursue its position from within the European institutions, by building alliances and seeking partners.

Péter Magyar’s speech at the Bled Strategic Forum on 31 August illustrated this dual approach particularly well. While expressing a clear commitment to Europe, he sharply criticised the EU for what he sees as a lack of political leadership and excessive bureaucracy, and described the migration fine imposed on Hungary as unfair.

This is why it may be misleading simply to describe the Hungarian transformation as “Hungary’s return to the EU”. Hungary, of course, never left the European Union. What is happening now is rather a return to the EU’s political mainstream.

There are already tangible signs of this: the normalisation of relations with the European Commission, the opening of access to EU funds, Tisza’s rapprochement with the EPP and the prospect of closing the Article 7 procedure. At the same time, there are clear limits: migration, the war in Ukraine, the interpretation of national sovereignty and the powers of EU institutions may all remain sources of serious disagreement.