Seismic shift in Venezuela – How it could affect Central and Eastern Europe

The repercussions of U.S. President Donald Trump’s involvement in Venezuela could ripple far, but for now, the countries of our region are likely to face mostly indirect effects, such as changes in oil prices or the EU sanctions policy.

The economic relationship between the European Union and Venezuela provides the framework within which the Visegrád Four (Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia) and Romania’s ties to Venezuela can be understood. The EU is Venezuela’s third-largest trading partner after the United States and China, with trade in goods reaching nearly €2.74 billion in 2024. EU exports to Venezuela mainly include machinery and equipment, mineral products, and chemicals, while EU imports are overwhelmingly crude oil, with smaller shares of fishery products and metals. Trade between the EU and Venezuela is based on WTO rules; there are no preferential or free trade agreements between the parties.

However, the V4 countries and Romania do not play a significant economic role in this system. Publicly available EU and international statistics show that none of these countries conduct substantial direct trade with Venezuela. Their interactions are mostly limited to sporadic, low-value exports, typically in the form of industrial or technical goods.

The limited nature of these economic relations is reinforced by the EU’s Venezuela policy. Since 2017, the EU has gradually imposed restrictive measures on certain members of Venezuela’s political and state elite, including asset freezes and travel bans. These measures have been repeatedly extended and updated, most recently in 2025, citing that democratic processes, rule of law, and human rights in the country have not improved significantly.

These sanctions do not constitute a general trade embargo, but they significantly increase financial, legal, and reputational risks for any company engaging with Venezuelan state or quasi-state entities. This environment is particularly discouraging for companies from the V4 countries and Romania, which, due to geographic and economic reasons, primarily focus on European markets.

These challenges are compounded by Venezuela’s prolonged economic crisis. Its economy is heavily dependent on oil exports, while infrastructure is degraded, the investment climate unpredictable, inflation persistently high, and a large portion of the population requires humanitarian assistance. Together, these factors limit Venezuela’s import capacity and payment ability, directly affecting potential trade partners.

Current political and economic changes in Venezuela—including disputes over electoral processes, possible modifications or tightening of sanctions, and uncertainty about the energy sector’s future—pose mostly risks rather than opportunities for the V4 countries and Romania in the short term. Although Venezuela’s substantial oil reserves could theoretically be attractive for diversifying European energy imports, the EU’s unified foreign and sanctions policy and internal instability in Venezuela make independent economic openings by Central and Eastern European countries unlikely.

Country-by-country analysis:

• Hungary: Economic relations with Venezuela are limited. Bilateral trade volumes have been negligible in recent years, and no sector is strategically significant. Past attempts at oil industry cooperation, including Minister Péter Szijjártó’s Caracas visit, have not materialized due to EU sanctions and Venezuela’s instability. Hungary’s Latin American economic focus lies elsewhere (e.g., Mexico, Brazil).
• Poland: Similarly, Venezuela is not a major trade partner, with minimal bilateral trade and no significant corporate presence or investment. Poland’s foreign economic strategy focuses on EU markets, the U.S., and East Asia, prioritizing more stable and larger Latin American markets. EU sanctions and Venezuela’s political situation discourage Warsaw from deepening ties.
• Czechia: Czech exports to Venezuela are also very limited, mainly occasional industrial equipment and machinery exports, forming no sustained trade relationship. Czech companies view the Venezuelan market as high-risk due to payment uncertainties, state intervention, and political instability. Prague’s Latin American focus is elsewhere.
• Slovakia: Economic ties with Venezuela are marginal, with bilateral trade statistically negligible and not linked to strategic industries. Slovakia’s exports are largely tied to European automotive and industrial value chains, which do not include Venezuela. The current Venezuelan environment offers no compelling incentives to develop relations.
• Romania: Among the regional countries, Romania shows relatively higher—but still low—export volumes to Venezuela in recent years. In 2023, Romanian exports to Venezuela were around USD 686,000, mainly machinery and technical equipment. This volume is neither economically nor politically significant and does not support long-term cooperation.

Current changes in Venezuela—whether political tensions post-Maduro, potential economic reforms, or the evolution of EU sanctions—affect these countries mostly indirectly, through EU-wide Venezuela policy and shifts in oil prices. Significant bilateral economic consequences would only be plausible if Venezuela stabilizes in the long term and the EU collectively eases restrictions, creating a more stable economic environment—something for which there is currently little indication.