Poland, Czechia back ‘coalition of the willing’, Hungary, Slovakia align with Trump

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As political landscapes shift across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), governments are recalibrating their approaches to Ukraine, European security, and internal governance.

The region remains split between pro-European integration and nationalist, often pro-Kremlin, forces: Czechia and Poland reinforce their commitments to Ukraine, while Hungary and Slovakia align with Moscow.

Meanwhile, in the north, the Baltics staunchly oppose Russian influence while, to the south, the Balkans navigate complex geopolitical pressures. With its own elections and leadership struggles ahead, the coming months will determine the balance of power in CEE.

Czechia remains firm on Ukraine, but Babis waits in wings

Czechia remains a firm supporter of Ukraine, despite shifts in the United States’ foreign policy under US President Donald Trump. Czech President Petr Pavel, formerly NATO’s number two, has backed a “broad coalition of the willing” to establish a just peace, an initiative that gained momentum at a 2 March meeting in London attended by Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk.

Following the summit, Starmer outlined the coalition’s four key commitments as sustained military and economic pressure, ensuring Ukraine’s sovereignty in peace negotiations, strengthening Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, and establishing the ‘Coalition of the Willing’.

Meanwhile, Czechia’s 70%-state-owned energy group CEZ is pursuing legal action against Russian energy firm Gazprom for over CZK 1bn (EUR 40mn) in unpaid dues, arguing that the Kremlin’s energy war began a year before the invasion with gradual supply cuts designed to drive up gas prices.

Domestically, Czechia is preparing for parliamentary elections in October. A recent poll showed opposition leader Andrej Babis’s populist ANO party on 34.7%, to the governing SPOLU alliance polling 18.5% and junior coalition partner Mayors and Independents on 11.4%. These numbers suggest potential political realignment, with Fiala under pressure.

Poland adopts bigger European role as presidential race looms

Poland is navigating a volatile political climate ahead of its presidential election on 18 May and a possible run-off round on 1 June. Polish President Andrzej Duda, an ally of the nationalist opposition party Law and Justice (PiS), continues to block key policies and appointments, limiting Tusk’s ability to exert influence both at home and in the EU.

The presidential race has taken an unexpected turn. Initially, Warsaw Mayor Rafal Trzaskowski, Tusk’s preferred candidate, was expected to face only a modest challenge from PiS-backed Karol Nawrocki. However, Slawomir Mentzen, co-chair of the far-right, libertarian Confederation (Konfederacja) party, has surged in popularity.

A 25-26 February SW Research/Wprost poll placed Trzaskowski on 33.6%, Mentzen polling 18.9%, and Nawrocki on 16.5%. Trzaskowski nevertheless remains the favourite in the second round, partly due to PiS’s unpopular alignment with Trump and its anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.

Magyar represents threat to pro-Kremlin Orban

In Hungary, opposition leader Peter Magyar is gaining traction against Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. An Iranytu poll, conducted from 1 December 2024 to 28 February 2025 with a sample of 6,600 respondents, showed Magyar’s TISZA party leading with 44%, while Orban’s ruling Fidesz-KDNP polls at 39%. Approximately 250,000 of Hungary’s around 8.2 million voters have shifted from Fidesz to TISZA.

Magyar, recently bolstered by the defection of former Hungarian Armed Forces chief Romulusz Ruszin-Szendi, held his largest rally yet, to around 50,000 supporters, on Saturday, 15 March, a national holiday. The 43-year-old MEP has also vowed to make Hungary part of a strong Europe, in contrast to Orban’s euroscepticism.

Meanwhile, Orban has further aligned himself with the Trump-Putin axis, instructing Hungarian diplomats to vote against Ukraine at the UN and regularly vetoing EU support initiatives for Ukraine.

Emboldened by Trump’s reelection, on Saturday Orban said in a speech that the “rulers of Europe decided that Ukraine must continue the war at all costs, and it will get a fast EU membership in exchange, using our money. We can only have one answer to that: a Union but without Ukraine.”

Slovakia bastion of pro-Russian sentiment

Slovakia’s leadership is also moving closer to Russia. Ruling party Smer vice-chairman and MEP Lubos Blaha met Russian spy chief Sergey Naryshkin on 5 March, underlining his government’s overtures to Moscow.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, reacting to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Oval Office meeting with Trump and US Vice President JD Vance, reiterated that Slovakia “will not support Ukraine financially or militarily to continue the war”.

Slovak voters remain among Europe’s most pro-Russian: only 23% of Slovaks trust Zelenskyy, while 28% trust Putin, a recent NMS Market Research poll showed. By contrast, in Czechia, 32% trust Zelenskyy, while only 11% trust Putin.

Opposition party Progressive Slovakia holds a slight lead over Fico’s Smer, with polling at 24-22% versus 22-21%, according to three February polls by NMS, AKO and Focus. In the event of a snap election, Fico’s hold on power could depend on the far-right Republika party.

Baltics remain staunch opponents to Putin

In the Baltics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain amongst the most vocal critics of Russian aggression within the EU and NATO. Estonia and Latvia recently introduced new sanctions targeting Russian oligarchs operating within the EU, focusing on financial restrictions, asset freezes, and curbs on business activities tied to Kremlin-linked figures.

Both countries have also expanded efforts to block Russian propaganda networks, revoking broadcasting licenses for Kremlin-aligned media and strengthening cybersecurity defences against potential Russian interference.

Lithuania has ramped up border security with Kremlin ally Belarus, deploying additional troops, surveillance drones, and thermal imaging technology along the heavily monitored frontier. Vilnius remains particularly wary of the hybrid threats posed by Minsk’s close ties to Moscow, with officials citing concerns over weaponised migration, cyberattacks and potential provocations involving Russian and Belarusian paramilitary groups. In response, Lithuania has accelerated military cooperation with Poland and Finland, bolstered its defence spending, and called for increased NATO troop deployments in the region.

Balkans mixed on Russia, Ukraine

Bulgaria and Romania remain strategically important in CEE. Bulgaria, balancing its historical ties to Russia with its NATO and EU commitments, recently expelled two Russian diplomats over espionage accusations.

Meanwhile, Romania has bolstered its military presence along the Black Sea, committing to NATO-led efforts to deter Russian aggression, as Bucharest hosts increasing numbers of US troops and military assets.

Further south, Serb President Aleksandar Vucic is attempting to balance EU aspirations with ties to Moscow. Montenegro, after years of political instability, is pushing towards closer NATO integration, while Kosovo’s ongoing tensions with Serbia remain a focal point for regional security.