Polish press: The Kremlin is looking for Orbán’s successor
Moscow must also rethink its regional position after Fidesz’s defeat, writes Gazeta Wyborcza. Russia has lost its most stable ally in the region, while still needing partner(s) within the EU.
The Hungarian election results are not only a domestic political turning point, but are also sending broader geopolitical shockwaves across Europe. According to an analysis published in Gazeta Wyborcza, the Kremlin is already examining how it can replace the key player it has lost within the European Union. The headline itself reflects this: Russia may be searching for an “Orbán 2.0” in the EU
The core argument is that Hungary’s previous political trajectory - especially its conflicts within the EU, its stance in sanctions debates, and its management of relations with Russia - represented strategic value for Moscow. In recent years, Budapest has on several occasions slowed down or reshaped EU decision-making, particularly in energy and foreign policy. This role as an “internal brake” was crucial at a time when the EU sought to act in a unified way toward Russia.
However, the election result could fundamentally alter this dynamic. It is no coincidence that, according to other sources, the Russian political elite had already been preparing for such a scenario. Based on information from Meduza, analyses had appeared even before the election that considered the possibility of Orbán’s defeat.
The question, however, is not only whether Moscow has lost an important partner, but also whether it can find new ones. In this sense, the term “Orbán 2.0” does not necessarily refer to a single politician, but rather to a political type: actors who are more critical of EU integration, more inclined to emphasize national sovereignty, and potentially more open to maintaining eastern - particularly Russian - relations.
This phenomenon is not new in Central and Eastern Europe. Over the past decade, several countries have seen the rise of political forces adopting a more critical tone toward the EU. In Poland, during the rule of Law and Justice (PiS), similar conflicts emerged with Brussels, although geopolitically Warsaw maintained a much stronger anti-Russian stance. In Slovakia, the return of Robert Fico has again raised the issue of eastern opening, while in Romania and Bulgaria there are also political currents sensitive to sovereignty debates within the EU.
The regional context therefore suggests that political fragmentation within the EU is a structural phenomenon, not confined to a single country. At the same time, Hungary’s previous role was unique in combining institutional weight, long-term political stability, and alternative geopolitical openness. The disruption of this combination creates a new situation.
From Brussels’ perspective, this is a double-edged development. In the short term, internal resistance that has hindered unified foreign policy and sanctions decisions may decrease. In the longer term, however, similar political trends could strengthen in other member states, particularly if driven by economic pressure, energy prices, or social tensions.
Instead of a single strong “Orbán replacement,” a multipolar system may emerge, where smaller countries and political forces jointly influence decision-making. Such a model is more difficult to manage and less predictable. (Hungary’s incoming prime minister, Péter Magyar, also stated after the election that he intends to deepen and possibly expand the V4, aiming to build a stronger Central European cooperation. This is also relevant from an investment and economic perspective. The unity of the EU is not only a political issue but also a market one: regulatory stability, energy policy, and trade directions all influence capital flows. It is also possible that Central Europe will not merely be a passive recipient, but an active shaper of these processes.)
In this sense, the Hungarian election clearly goes beyond itself. It is part of a broader trend in which Europe - and within it, the eastern region - is redefining its geopolitical and economic weight, with not only Brussels but also Moscow and other global actors actively searching for new points of balance.
